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Risk premia in the consumption capital asset pricing model depend on prefer-
ences and dividend. We develop a decomposition which allows a separate treatmen-
t of both components. We show that preferences alone determine the risk-return
tradeoff measured by the Sharpe-ratio. In general, the risk-return trade-off implied
by preferences depends on the elasticity of a preference-based stochastic discount
factor for pricing assets with respect to the consumption innovation. Depending
on the particular specification of preferences, the absolute value of this elasticity
can coincide to the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (e.g. for
habit formation preferences) or the coefficient of relative risk-aversion (e.g. for
Epstein-Zin preferences). We demonstrate that preferences based on a small elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution, such as habit formation, produce small risk
premia once agents are allowed to save. Departing from the complete markets
framework, we show that uninsurable risk can only increase the Sharpe-ratio and
risk premia if dividends are correlated with individual consumption.
3
1 Introduction
Risk premia derived from the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) are
determined by two parts: preferences and dividends. In most of the literature these
two concepts have been entangled because dividends have been modeled as claims to
consumption. Besides the lack of a better model for dividends in an aggregate econo-
my, there is no justification to equate dividends with aggregate consumption. On the
contrary, this modeling choice has led to a confusing interpretation of the role of con-
sumption in determining risk premia. In this paper we provide a decomposition of the
role of preferences and dividends. We show that preferences alone determine the posi-
tion of the capital market line in the conditional mean - standard deviation diagram.
Dividends are responsible for the position of a given asset on or below the capital mar-
ket line. We argue that the Sharpe-ratio defined as the slope of the capital market line
summarizes the risk - return tradeoff implied by preferences. We derive a simple way to
compute the Sharpe-ratio for any preference specification: the Sharpe ratio depends on
the product of the standard deviation of the consumption innovation with the elasticity
of a preference-based stochastic discount factor (PSDF) for pricing assets with respect
to the innovation in consumption. Hence, for any general specification of preferences
the only parameter affecting risk premia is this preference factor elasticity. To match
the observed Sharpe-ratio in post-war US data of about 0.27, the elasticity has to equal
about -50.
We demonstrate how this PSDF elasticity is related to more conventional preference
parameters for different utility functions. For standard time-separable power utility, that
PSDF elasticity equals the negative of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. For power preferences with habit
formation, that PSDF elasticity equals the negative inverse of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution but is not directly related to relative risk aversion. For recursive
Epstein-Zin preferences, that PSDF elasticity is related to relative risk aversion but not
to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This shows that neither risk aversion nor
intertemporal substitution in general determine risk premia.
No matter what preferences are assumed, a very negative PSDF elasticity of about
-50 is required to match the observed Sharpe-ratio. This has important implications. We
will argue below that that a satisfactory solution for the equity premium puzzle (or the
Sharpe-ratio puzzle, as we define it) which depends on preferences of an representative
consumer should fulfill the following additional criteria. For a given set of parameters,
these preferences should imply a Sharpe-ratio of about 0.27 which requires a PSDF
elasticity of about -50, they should not imply an extremely low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and they should not rely on extremely high risk aversion. The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution controls the desire to smooth consumption between periods. If
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the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very low, consumers will be very reluctant
to adjust consumption over time and hence will imply that consumption will be too
smooth as soon as consumers are allowed to save (which they are not in the Lucas
(1978) exchange economy). This will in turn imply a low Sharpe ratio. We regard a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of around 50 as equally unplausible. While it is hard
to estimate risk aversion directly, Barsky, Kimball, Juster and Shapiro (1995) present
survey evidence. They find that most individuals are very risk averse with an average
risk aversion across individuals of about 4. Moreover, extremely risk averse agents would
be willing to pay large amounts to avoid atemporal gambles. A simple calculation shows
that an agent with relative risk aversion of 50 would be willing to pay 8.7% of her wealth
to avoid a 50-50 gamble to win or loose 10% of her wealth.
None of the preferences considered passes all three criteria. Habit formation, while
allowing for low risk aversion, relies on a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Epstein-Zin preferences require a high risk aversion and time-separable power prefer-
ences fail on both grounds. Perhaps, a combination of habit formation and Epstein-Zin
preferences has the potential to be consistent with our criteria.
We furthermore show that standard dividend processes are not volatile enough to
produce sizeable risk premia, even when we assume that preferences imply a Sharpe-
ratio of one quarter. Following the tradition of modeling aggregate dividends as claims
to aggregate consumption, we show that (log) consumption is not volatile enough by a
factor of about 13 to account for the observed equity premium, even given a Sharpe-
ratio of 0.27. In other words, puzzles about risk premia can be decomposed into a puzzle
about the Sharpe-ratio and a puzzle about dividend processes. The Sharpe-ratio puzzle
only concerns preferences and is completely independent of the dividend puzzle. Hence
different research agendas are required to address the two separate puzzles.
In extensions to the basic model, we demonstrate that our setup can easily be ex-
tended to allow for multiple factors (e.g. to model inflation risk for bonds). There is
empirical evidence that the Sharpe-ratio is time-varying, for example due to business cy-
cle movements. We show that this can be modeled either by assuming a heteroskedastic
consumption or by generating a time-varying preference factor elasticity. Campbell and
Cochrane (1996) present such a model.
Another application of the Sharpe-ratio criterion are models with idiosyncratic risk
and uninsurable income shocks. These models have received a lot of attention lately as
a possible way to generate large risk premia (Weil (1992), Lucas (1994), Heaton and
Lucas (1996), Constantinides and Duffy (1996), Den Haan (1996)). We show that the
Sharpe-ratio only increases when there are assets with dividends which are correlated
with the idiosyncratic component of consumption. Since this component is assumed to
be uninsurable, it is questionable whether these assets exist. Hence, it is not obvious
how these models can generate a larger Sharpe-ratio and risk premia.
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The analysis could be sharpened in a number of ways. First, we take the point esti-
mates as given without taking account estimation standard errors. Second, the estimates
represent unconditional moments while the theory is written in terms of conditional
moments. Intuition suggests that it is even harder to fit the model using conditional
estimates, but this is also worth investigating more closely. On the theoretical side, we
deal only with risk premia. Preferences also determine the risk-free rate. Weil (1989)
argues that there is also a risk-free rate puzzle which we do not address.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized
facts concerning risk premia and the Sharpe-ratio. Section 3 shows the decomposition
of risk premia into the Sharpe-ratio and dividends. Section 4 studies some preference
specifications which have been proposed in the literature using our decomposition. Sec-
tion 5 shows that preferences which generate high Sharpe-ratios imply that consumption
becomes extremely smooth once there are some smoothing possibilities. Section 6 looks
at how models with idiosyncratic shocks fare in terms of the Sharpe-ratio and section 7
concludes.
2 The Facts
Table 1 summarizes some important and well-known facts about asset markets. The data
are sampled at quarterly frequency and range from 1/48 to 1/96. Returns are real and
reported in per cent. T-bills have a low mean return and do not vary much over time.
Long Government bonds have a slightly higher average return than T-bills but are much
more volatile. Stocks, measured here as the SP500 index, have a substantially higher
mean return than bonds and are also more volatile. Asset premia are returns minus
returns to T-bills. The equity premium is much higher than the long bond premium.
The ratio of the average return premium divided by the standard deviation of the return
premium is much higher for stocks than for long bonds. In other words, stocks deliver a
higher return per unit of standard deviation.
Figure 1 shows the return data in the standard textbook mean-standard deviation
frontier. It is standard practice to use a broad stock market index as an approximation
for the market portfolio. Hence the capital market line (CML) is the ray starting at the
T-bill point through the SP500 point. The slope is known as the Sharp-ratio (or the
price of risk). In postwar quarterly data, the Sharpe-ratio is 0.27. Note, that this is a
lower bound of the Sharpe-ratio, since it is defined as the maximal ratio of mean return
to standard deviation. There might very well exist an asset with a higher price of risk
than the SP500, for example an index of small stocks. For the remainder of this paper,
we take a Sharpe-ratio of 0.27 as a fact.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) have shown that standard models are not able to produce
a large enough wedge between risky and riskless assets. They were concerned with
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Table 1: Asset Market Facts
Real Returns, US data, % per quarter, 1/1948-1/96
Asset Mean Std. Deviation Mean/Std. Deviation
T-bills 0.19 0.86
Long Gov’t Bonds 0.37 4.83
SP500 2.17 7.53
Long Gov’t Bond Premium 0.18 4.75 0.038
Equity Premium 1.99 7.42 0.268
Note: Returns are measured at quarterly frequency. Units are per cent per
quarter. Risk premia are computed as the difference between the asset return
and the T-bill rate. Source: Ibbotson Associates
matching the first moment of the equity premium. Much of the literature following
Mehra and Prescott (1985) has continued in that fashion. In this paper, we argue that
the ratio of the first and second moments is even more important than just the first
moment. In other words, we focus of the risk-return tradeoff implied by a model. In
terms of the mean-standard deviation diagram, we decompose the equity premium into
two parts. First, we study which features of the model determine the slope of the capital
market line. Given the position of the CML, we ask what determines the position of
assets on (or below) the CML. This decomposition will turn out to be extremely useful
to evaluate models regarding their risk-return implications.
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the unconditional moments of asset returns. In other
words, these moments are simple sample averages. In contrast, the theory laid out below
will be written in terms of conditional moments. It is important to keep this difference
in mind. We do not attempt a serious investigation of this issue, however, one can see
intuitively how Figure 1 will be affected once conditional moments are considered. It is
well-known that it is difficult to forecast mean returns of assets while squared returns
are forecastable, for example using GARCH processes. This implies that the CML
for conditonal asset returns will be steeper than for unconditional returns. Hence, the
unconditional Sharpe-ratio can be viewed as a lower bound compared to a more serious
investigation of conditional moments. For now, we take a Sharpe-ratio of 0.27 as given
keeping in mind that the the conditional Sharpe-ratio is probably higher.
3 Decomposing Risk Premia
Risk premia based on on the consumption CAPM modeled have two separate compo-
nents: preferences and dividends. In this section we provide a framework which allows
7
Figure 1: Mean-Standard Deviation Frontier: Quarterly Data














Note: CML with postwar quarterly data from Table 1.
a sharp decomposition of these parts. The approach is in spirit of the Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991) volatility bounds. However, we make a slightly more restrictive dis-
tributional assumptions to obtain an analytical framework which lends itself better to
economic interpretation. The key assumption in addition to Hansen and Jagannathan
is that the innovation in consumption are lognormal, but not necessarily i.i.d.. We show
that preferences determine the position of the capital market line in the (conditional)
mean-standard deviation diagram. Given the capital market line, dividends determine
the position of a given asset on (or below) the capital market line.
3.1 Consumption-based Asset Pricing
To talk meaningfully about consumption-based asset pricing in general, we envision the
following framework. Let (St)t be a Markov process on some state space and let the
consumption1 Ct ∈ R of some agent under consideration2 be determined by a function
Ct = C(St) of the state St. Let Zt ∈ RnZ denote “summary” information about past
consumption, evolving according to a summarizer function g:
Zt = g(Ct, Zt−1)
1Note, that we concentrate on the case of a single consumption good. The case of multiple consump-
tion goods is not hard to treat as well, see appendix A for details.
2We do not yet presume that this agent is representative.
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Let V (St, Zt−1) ∈ R be the “value function” of the remaining stream of consumption as
of date t, evolving according to
V (S, Z) = f (C(S), Z, E [h (V (S ′, g(C(S), Z))) | S] , S) (1)
where f(C,Z,E, S) ∈ R is an aggregator function and h(V ) ∈ R is a (typically mono-
tone) transformation of V . The agent prefers higher values of V (·, ·) to lower values.
This framework is discussed in greater detail in appendix A. There, it is shown how
all the particular utility functions discussed in this paper can be written in this form.
Furthermore, assuming existence and differentiability, the asset pricing formula
Et [Mt+1Rt+1] = 1, (2)
is derived (see equation (45)). This is the well-known Lucas (1978) asset pricing formula,
generalized to the context here. As for notation: Et[·] is short-hand for the conditional
expectation E[· | St]. Mt+1 is a function of past, present and future consumption of
the agent as well as the states St and St+1, which is measurable with respect to the
information of date t + 1. It is rigorously derived in A.2 and defined in equation (44).
Rt+1 is the gross return on any asset from period t to t+ 1. For example, if some asset





The factor Mt+1 is a preference-based stochastic discount factor (PSDF), which one might
think of as a generalized version of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. In
fact, it coincides with the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for the standard
case of a time separable utility function (i.e. for the case in which the aggregator func-
tion f(C,Z, S, E) is linear in E and independent of Z). However, we would like to avoid
calling it the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution also in this general setting.
Such a terminology might misleading because the “substitution experiment” here is one
of one unit of consumption at date t versus a bundle of consumption at date t+1, namely
one unit for each contingency. Thus, attitudes towards risk aversion as well as attitudes
towards intertemporal substitution matter for the agent in evaluating this “experiment”
and thus, they matter for Mt+1. Separating these two from each other is precisely the
point of the work by e.g. Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), and calling Mt+1 the “intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution” could be misunderstood as a claim that it is only
intertemporal substitution which matters. Furthermore, for some preferences, certain
coefficients have been labeled to represent the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: it
may thus be confusing if we called Mt+1 the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
and then tried to explain, why it is occasionally unrelated to that elasticity. To avoid
this potential confusion, we call Mt+1 the preference-based stochastic discount factor for
pricing asset.
9
What matters, for our analysis however, is the fact that Mt+1 is independent of the
asset under consideration. This important property is proved in A.2. Thus, equation
(2) shows that the stochastics underlying asset pricing can be broken into two, unre-
lated pieces: the stochastics coming from the asset return and embodied in Rt+1 and
the stochastics from the consumption process and its utility evaluation by the agent,
embodied in Mt+1. This insight is the key building block of our analysis.
3
To proceed with our analysis, it is useful to utilize loglinear approximations. Let lower
cases denote the logarithm of a variable, e.g. ct = logCt. Without loss of generality we
can decompose log consumption into its conditional expectations and its innovation
ct+1 = Etct+1 + εt+1. (4)
The substantive assumption we make is that the innovations in log consumption are
normal: εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε,t). Note that the variance is allowed to change over time.
A key issue is the interpretation of (4). Lucas (1978) assumes a pure exchange e-
conomy to derive (2). Hence, consumers cannot smooth consumption over time and are
forced to consume their exogenously given endowment. In other words consumption can
be modeled as being exogenous to the model and εt is the ‘deep’ shock. However, more
realistic models allow consumers to choose consumption based on some more fundamen-
tal shock to the economy. These smoothing channels might include storage, savings, and
labor input. We will contrast models with these features with the Lucas (1978) model
below. Nevertheless, the asset pricing calculations given a consumption process are valid
in any model.
For the rest of the paper we assume that the preference-based stochastic discount
factor for pricing assets depends only on consumption. This is in line with most of the
CCAPM literature but it is restrictive. Many macroeconomic models assume the utility
also depends on the amount of leisure enjoyed in a period. Abstracting from leisure we
can decompose the log PSDF in a similar fashion as log consumption as
mt+1 = Etmt+1 + ηmε,t+1εt+1. (5)
ηxy denotes the elasticity of variable x with respect to variable y. 4 ηmε represents the
elasticity of the PSDF with respect to the consumption innovation ε and plays a crucial
role for asset prices. This elasticity is determined by the preferences. For time-separable
CRRA preferences, we have mt+1 = −γ∆ct+1 where γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (RRA). Hence ηmε = −γ. 5 However, for more general preferences, such as
3Of course, it also is the key building block in the Hansen-Jagannathan analysis of consumption-based
capital asset pricing models, see Cochrane and Hansen (1982).
4In general the elasticities and innovation-variances can be time-varying, i.e. they have a time
subscript. In order to avoid excessive notation, we will usually leave away the time subscript. However,
the reader should keep in mind that our setup allows for this.
5It is easily shown that for any time-separable preferences, ηmε = −RRA = −1/EIS.
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habit formation, ηmε will not equal the RRA as we will show below. One of the key
insights is that ηmε is the only preference parameter relevant for risk premia. Note, that
we allow for a time-changing elasticity as well which might arise due to time-inseparable
preferences (see Campbell and Cochrane (1996) for such a model).
To compute the price of an asset we need to specify its dividends. In principle any
dividend stream can be priced using equation (2). A real bond is defined as having
Dt = 1. A claim to consumption (which often is used as ‘equity’ in exchange economies)
has Dt = Ct. In models with an explicit production sector dividends to equity are
usually the rental rate of capital, which depends on the marginal product of capital.
The second component of any asset is its maturity. A short real bond pays a dividend
only in the next period, long bonds pay for several periods. For now, we only consider
assets with dividends which only depend on the consumption stream, this will be relaxed
later (to allow for example for inflation risk). Decompose the log return of an asset in
its conditional expectation and innovation:
rt+1 = Etrt+1 + ηrεεt+1. (6)
Since asset dividends are assumed to be affected only by innovations in consumption, the
unexpected return depends only on εt+1. ηrε is the elasticity of the return with respect
to the consumption innovation and depends on the dividend stream of the asset. For
example, the return of a riskless real 1-period bond is unaffected by ε and therefore
has ηrε = 0. Hence the log risk-free rate equals minus the expected log PSDF: r
f
t+1 =
−Etmt+1. ηrε equals unity for a 1-period claim to consumption. Assets with longer
maturity can have more complicated ηrε because of capital gains.
Using the normality assumption of ε we can use equation (2) to express the expected
return of an asset as 6
Etrt+1 = −Etmt+1 − (ηrε + ηmε)
2σ2ε /2. (7)
Let ret+1 = logEtRt+1 be the logarithm of the expected gross return.
7 Equation (7) can









where σmr,t is the conditional covariance between the log PSDF and the log asset return.
Equation (8) is the well known consumption CAPM (CCAPM) written in logs. Assets
with a high conditional covariance with the PSDF carry a low risk premium. In this
model the conditional covariance is the negative of a product of three parts. First, the
6For normal x, E(ex) = eE(x)+.5Var(x).
7Note, that in general ret+1 6= Etrt+1 because of Jensen’s inequality. Using this notation, we avoid
cluttering the equations with variance terms which are due to Jensen’s inequality.
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elasticity of the PSDF with respect to the consumption innovation. This number depends
only on the preferences of the consumer and will be the same for different assets. Second,
the elasticity of the asset return with respect to ε which depends on the dividend stream
of the asset.
As demonstrated by Mehra and Prescott (1985), the risk premia generated by this
model are much smaller than risk premia in real financial markets. Since risk premia
are composed of preferences and dividends, it is useful to decompose the effect of the
two parts. This insight was the motivation of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) to study
volatility bounds of the PSDF. The drawback of their approach is that it is difficult to
obtain economic intuition regarding their bounds. Given our lognormal model we obtain
simple analytical expressions for the role of preferences and the role of dividends.
3.2 The Role of Preferences
In this subsection we show that preferences alone determine the position of the capi-
tal market line (CML) in the conditional mean-standard deviation frontier. The CML
restricts the position of asset in the mean-standard deviation frontier since all assets
by definition have to lie below it. Hence the slope of the CML, usually referred to as
Sharpe-ratio or price of risk, is a useful measure of the risk-return tradeoff of preferences.
Note, that dividends of specific assets play no role here. Therefore the role of preferences
concerning risk premia can be summarized by the CML.
To compute the CML we require the risk-free rate and the Sharpe-ratio. The risk-free
rate is simply the inverse of the expected PSDF: Rft+1 = 1/EtMt+1. The Sharpe-ratio is





















where σt denotes the conditional standard deviation operator and ρt the conditional cor-
relation operator. Note that one asset with ρt = −1 is a 1-period claim to consumption.
The Sharpe-ratio is solely a function of the first and second conditional moments
of the PSDF. It is important to realize that it is independent of any particular asset.
The properties of the PSDF are sufficient to calculate the risk-return tradeoff of the
preferences. In our model we can write the Sharpe-ratio as follows (again using the












Figure 2: Mean-Standard Deviation Frontier Implied by Preferences













Note: Figure shows the conditional mean-standard deviation frontier implied
by time-separable CRRA preferences with γ = 40.
≈ −ηmεσε, (14)
where σ2m,t denotes the conditional variance of the log PSDF.
9 All standard preferences
will imply a negative elasticity of the PSDF with respect to a positive consumption
innovation, hence the solution in equation (14) represents the upper ray in the mean-
standard deviation diagram. The Sharpe-ratio is the product of the negative elasticity of
the PSDF with respect to ε and the standard deviation of ε. The Sharpe-ratio together
with the risk free rate tells us the maximal risk premium of an asset for a given standard
deviation. All assets, independent of their dividend stream, are positioned in the cone
formed by the two rays starting at the risk-free rate with slope SRt and −SRt in Figure
2. Figure 2 shows the CML for CRRA preferences with γ = 40 and σε = 0.56%.
9The Sharpe-ratio in the data is 0.27 (see Table 1). For small number like this, the approximation is
very precise: (e(.265
2) − 1).5 = .27. Alternatively, we could define risk premia as Et [Rt+1] /R
f
t+1. Then
(14) is the exact expression for the Sharpe-ratio.
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A simple calculation shows that standard time-separable CRRA preferences require
a very high risk aversion (or, equivalently, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
close to zero) to create a large enough risk-return tradeoff. Recall from Table 1 that the
ratio of the mean to the standard deviation of the equity premium is 0.27 in quarterly
data. Hence the Sharpe-ratio in the data is at least 0.27. For time-separable CRRA
preferences ηmε = −γ, where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The standard
deviation of the innovation in log consumption is 0.56% in quarterly postwar US data
(see Campbell and Cochrane (1996)). Hence a risk aversion of 48 is required to match
the point estimate for the Sharpe-ratio. Figure 2 shows the mean-standard deviation
diagram for γ = 40. The SP500 is located outside the admissible region. Note that the
long bonds are well inside the cone.
This demonstrates that standard preferences require a very high risk aversion, as
already noted by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Risk aversion coefficients of around 50 are
usually regarded as implausible. As a response to this result, many alternative preference
specifications have been considered in the literature. We will evaluate these using our
Sharpe-ratio criterion below. However, note that the only preference parameter which
affects the risk-return tradeoff of any preference specification is the elasticity of the PSDF
to the consumption innovation.
3.3 Dividends
After studying the role of preferences in determining risk premia, we now look at divi-
dends. In most of the CCAPM literature aggregate dividends are modeled as claims to
aggregate consumption. From a theoretical perspective this is clearly an unsatisfactory
approach. However, the underlying Lucas exchange economy does not allow for a more
refined definition of dividends. Even in models with an explicit production sector it is
not obvious how to model dividends. One reason is that the optimal capital structure
of profit maximizing firms is undetermined. So leverage becomes essentially a free pa-
rameter which cannot be pinned down by theory. This difficulty in defining dividends
is precisely one reason why we regard the decomposition in preferences and dividends
as a useful one. One can argue about a treatment of dividends in a given model but
the role of preferences should be transparent. In this section, we follow the questionable
approach and model dividends as claims to consumption. We do that not to defend this
approach but to compare our model with the existing literature.
Essentially, we ask the following question: Suppose we have found set of preferences
which produce a high enough Sharpe-ratio, are standard dividend processes capable of
producing reasonable risk premia? Note that we can rewrite risk premia from equation
(9) using the Sharpe-ratio as
rrpt+1 = SR ηrεσε. (15)
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Figure 3: Leverage in the Mean-Standard Deviation Frontier














Note: Figure shows the effect of leverage for a given Sharpe-ratio of 0.27.
Recall that ηrε depends on the dividends of the asset. Lacking a better way to define
equity in this setup, we follow the standard practice and define a claim to consumption
as equity. First, consider for simplicity a 1-period claim to consumption. As mentioned
earlier, ηrε = 1 for this asset and σε = 0.56%. Hence, the risk premium for the 1-period
consumption claim, given a Sharpe-ratio of 0.27, is rrpt+1 = 0.15%. This number is too
small by about a factor of 10 compared to the equity premium in the data. Hence
consumption as dividends is not volatile enough even given the Sharpe-ratio from the
data. To see how far the simple consumption claim is off, consider a levered claim to
consumption: Dt = C
ξ
t , where ξ denotes the ‘leverage factor’. The risk premium is given
by
rrpt+1 = SR ξ σε. (16)
Hence a leverage factor of 13.2 is required to generate a 2% equity premium. In terms of
the mean-standard deviation diagram, leverage moves the position of the consumption
claim on the CML as shown in Figure 3.
The argument above was based on a 1-period claim to consumption. Equity is a long
run asset, however. It is well known that all term-premia are zero when log-consumption
follows a random walk. So in this case, a long-run claim to consumption will carry the
same risk premium a the 1-period claim. If consumption growth is autocorrelated, this
is not true any longer. In post-war data, the autocorrelation of consumption growth is
15
0.16. Using this value, an infinite claim to consumption implies ηrε = 1.2. Hence the risk
premium will be 20% higher than that of the one-period claim. Using the same argument
as above, a ξ of about 11 is required to obtain a 2% risk premium for the infinite claim.
3.4 A Diagnosis
Risk premia depend on preferences and dividends. We decompose both effects using the
Sharpe-ratio as a measure of the risk-return tradeoff implied by the preferences. Divi-
dends determine the position of assets on the CML. We find that standard preferences
and dividend processes fail on both counts. In other words, the equity premium puzzle is
the sum of a Sharpe-ratio puzzle and dividend puzzle. In our opinion, both are completely
separate issues and require separate research agendas. The Sharpe-ratio based on our
lognormal model is furthermore useful as a very simple diagnostic tool for evaluating
preferences in regard of their risk-return implications. It follows the spirit of the Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991) bounds but is much easier to use since it depends only on the
elasticity of the PSDF with respect to the consumption innovation. This parameter
is easily calculated for any preference specification and does not require estimation of
volatility bounds. A further advantage is that the analytical expression for the Sharpe-
ratio allows for a transparent economic interpretation. The only substantive assumption
needed is the conditional lognormality of consumption innovations.
3.5 Some Useful Properties
In this section we present some useful properties of the model. We consider possible
changes in the location of the CML and show how other shocks affecting asset returns
can be build into the model.
3.5.1 Moving the CML
So far we implicitly assumed that the position of the CML is constant over time. However,
there is evidence that the risk-free rate is changing over time as well evidence that the
slope is not constant over time, see Campbell and Cochrane (1996) and the references
therein. In our setup, it is easy to see what model ingredients cause what move in the
CML. The risk-free rate is just the inverse of the expected PSDF. For the case of time-
separable CRRA preferences any expected change in consumption will cause the risk-free
rate to change. This could be due to serial correlation in log consumption. This will
change the risk-free rate but will leave the Sharpe-ratio constant, hence the CML shifts
up and down with predictable changes in consumption.
However, (14) shows what is needed to change the slope of the CML: either a time-
varying elasticity of the PSDF or time-variation in the standard deviation of consumption
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innovation. Campbell and Cochrane’s (1996) nonlinear ‘catching-up-with-the-Joneses’
model produces a time-varying ηmε,t causing the CML to tilt around the risk-free rate.
3.5.2 Multiple Shocks
So far we assumed that the unexpected return of any asset is perfectly correlated with the
shock to consumption, see equation (6). This amounts to assuming that log dividends
are of the form dt = ξct. In other words, the model was a pure one-factor model. This
implies that all assets are located on the CML. Figure 1 shows however, that long Gov’t
bonds are far below the CML. In other words the ratio of mean return to standard
deviation is smaller. For a model which can produce this we need a second shock. For
bonds this could for example be inflation risk. Hence we write the log return of an asset
as
rt+1 = Etrt+1 + ηrεεt+1 + νt+1 (17)
= Etrt+1 + wt+1, (18)
where wt+1 = ηrεεt+1 + νt+1. We assume that νt is normally distributed with zero mean
and variance σ2v.
10 It is easily checked that the risk premia are unchanged since only
covariance risk with the innovation of log consumption is priced. However, now the ratio
of the conditional risk premium and conditional standard deviation is
rrpt+1
σw
= SR ρεw, (19)
where ρεw is the correlation of ε and w. Hence by increasing the variance of ν, and
therefore decreasing ρεw, the asset moves horizontally to the right away from the mean-
standard deviation frontier, see 4. For long Government bonds the ratio of mean return
to standard deviation is 0.038 implying ρεw = 0.17. Hence σν has to be about five times
as large as ηrεσε. The unpriced (inflation) risk dominates the real risk.
Up to now, we implicitly assumed that the innovation in consumption ε and returns
of the SP500 index are perfectly correlated. This implies of course that the SP500 index
lies on the CML. In the data this assumption is far from the facts. To get a rough idea,
consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. Ignoring issues of conditonal
versus unconditional moments and assuming log consumption follows a random walk, the
correlation between consumption innovations and SP500 returns in post-war data is only
0.14. If we take this value as given, the true slope of the CML has to be 0.27/0.14=1.92,
see Figure 4. This in turn implies that a ηmε = −344 is required to achieve a Sharpe-ratio
of 1.92. This demonstrates clearly that a less than perfect correlation of the innovations
in consumption and asset returns, which we find in the data, pose an additional challenge
on top of the high risk premium for claims to consumption.
10Again we could allow for time changing variance as well.
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Figure 4: Multiple Factors in the Mean-Standard Deviation Frontier









(implied ρεw = 0.017)T-bills
CML, slope=0.27
ρεw = 1 ρεw = 0.67 ρεw = 0.5
Note: Figure shows the effect of a second shock to dividends for a given
Sharpe-ratio of 0.27.
4 Alternative Preferences
In this section we evaluate some preference specification which have been studied in
the literature using our Sharpe-ratio diagnostic tool. We consider the standard time-
separable CRRA case, habit formation (Constantinides (1990)), ‘catching-up-with-the-
Joneses’ (Abel (1990)), and nonexpected utility (Epstein and Zin (1991)) whether they
are capable of producing a realistic risk-return tradeoff (i.e. a Sharpe-ratio of 0.27) for
realistic parameter values. Recall that the only preference parameter which affects risk
premia and the Sharpe-ratio is ηmε. Hence, even if different preferences look very different
at first sight, they can imply exactly the same risk premia, given a consumption stream,
if ηmε coincide. Another implication is that it is neither risk aversion nor intertemporal
substitution which determines risk premia. As we will see, for certain preferences there
will be a link between ηmε and risk aversion (e.g. CRRA and Epstein-Zin) and hence risk
aversion determines risk premia. However, for other preferences such as habit formation,
ηmε is linked to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and not risk aversion. For
those preferences risk aversion does not play a direct role for risk premia. Hence the
deep parameter which controls risk premia for any general set of preferences is ηmε.
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4.1 Time-separable CRRA








The parameter γ measure RRA. Note that the inverse of γ equals the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS): EIS = 1/γ. The log of the PSDF is given by
mt+1 = −γ∆ct+1 (21)
and hence ηmε = −γ. As already calculated above, an extremely high RRA of about
-50 is needed to match the Sharpe-ratio in the data. This corresponds to entering the
volatility bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) for high RRA.
4.2 Habit Formation
Constantinides (1990) presents a preference specification in which utility not only de-





(Ct+j − θCt+j−1)1−γ − 1
1− γ
. (22)
Constantinides (1990) proposes a slightly more general process for the habit component.















Note that (23) reduces to (21) for θ = 0. Since conditional expectations have to be
computed, we assume at this point that log consumption is a random walk with drift:







where x̄ = X̄/C̄ = θe−g is the steady state proportion of the habit of total consumption.
ηmε is the sum of two parts. The first term in (24) represents the effect that effective
consumption is consumption expenditures minus the habit. Hence the effect of the
parameter γ in (22) is dividend by the proportion of consumption net of the habit of
total consumption. The second term is due to the fact that an increase in consumption
today has an effect on marginal utility tomorrow. Note that ηmε measures the curvature
of the utility function (22) with respect to consumption. As Constantinides (1990)
19
Table 2: RRA vs. ηmε: Habit Formation
parameters: β = 0.95, g = 0.44%, γ = 1
θ RRA ηmε −γ/(1− x̄)
0.1 1.005 -1.238 -1.111
0.3 1.011 -2.159 -1.426
0.5 1.046 -4.667 -1.991
0.7 1.106 -14.27 -3.300
0.8 1.182 -32.36 -4.914
0.9 1.410 -113.99 -9.620
0.95 1.863 -336.56 -18.468
0.99 5.427 -2106.52 -69.709
Note: Table shows RRA using (25) and ηmε using (24) for different values
of θ. Parameters β and g are calibrated from postwar US data. γ is set to
unity.
stresses risk aversion measures the reluctance of consumers to accept atemporal gambles







Table 2 shows RRA and ηmε for different values of θ. The curvature in the period utility
function γ is set to unity. Increasing θ increases ηmε much more than RRA. The reason
is that habit formation consumers are not that averse to gambles in wealth because they
can slowly adjust consumption in response to a decrease in wealth. In contrast, they are
very reluctant to suddenly adjust consumption since this will require them to consume
more in the future as well. This distinction has been discussed in quite some depth by
Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995). Recall that a ηmε of around 50 is needed to obtain
the point estimate of the Sharpe-ratio of 0.27. The table shows that this can be achieved
by setting θ to about 0.82 with γ = 1. However this implies that the proportion of the
habit is around 82% of total consumption. Alternatively, one can increase γ and select
a lower θ. Note that risk aversion does not increase to unrealistic values in either case.
However, as we will argue later a high ηmε is equally unrealistic on theoretical grounds
as a high RRA. Recall that ηmε measures the reluctance to change consumption between
periods. A high ηmε implies that consumers are extremely unwilling to adjust consump-
tion. In the Lucas (1978) model this has no consequences because agents cannot transfer
consumption at all from one period to another. However, if there are any smoothing
channels which enable consumers to smooth consumption, a high ηmε implies that they
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want to use these channels and create a smooth consumption path. In the next section
we will demonstrate that consumption will be far too smooth in models with even moder-
ate smoothing channels if the EIS is very low. This raises serious doubt whether models
which require a high ηmε via a low EIS are really a solution for the equity premium
puzzle.
4.3 ‘Catching-up-with-the-Joneses’
Abel (1990) presents a simplified model of habit persistence where individual utility
depends on individual consumption as well as on aggregate consumption. It can easily
be shown that the PSDF of the individual consumer is similar to (23) with all the terms
regarding the effect on marginal utility in t + 1 are ignored, i.e. the terms in square
brackets in (23) equal zero. In other words, the individual does not the effect on marginal
utility of changing consumption into account. With this preference specification, the
consumption externality which was present in habit formation preferences disappears.
Therefore we find that RRA = −ηmε = γ/(1− x̄). Hence, creating a high Sharpe-ratio
is only possible at the cost of a high RRA and low EIS. Table 2 reports values for
ηmε = −γ/(1− x̄) for different θ.
4.4 ‘Catching-up-with-the-Joneses’ when habit depends on cur-
rent consumption
Preferences (22) assume that habit depends on lagged consumption. In a recent paper,
Campbell and Cochrane (1996) allow habit to depend on current consumption. As we
will show below this drives again a wedge between RRA and the EIS, and the Sharpe-
ratio depends on the EIS. Campbell and Cochrane set up the model as follows (see their





(Ct+j −Xt+j)1−γ − 1
1− γ
. (26)
The habit Xt is allowed to depend on current consumption. Instead of positing a process
for Xt, Campbell and Cochrane choose to work with the surplus ratio St = (Ct−Xt)/Xt.








Campbell and Cochrane show that RRA is given by γ/St. Note that since St is varying
over time, RRA is moving as well. In bad times (i.e. St is small), the consumers will be
more risk averse. To close the model, the process for linking St to consumption has to
be specified. Campbell and Cochrane assume for st = logSt:
st = (1− φ)s̄+ φst−1 + λ (st−1) εt.
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= −γ(1 + λ(st)). (28)
Several things are worth noting. First, ηmε,t and hence asset prices depend on the EIS
as in the internal habit case. Second, risk aversion does not directly affect risk premia.
Third, the Sharpe-ratio and therefore risk premia are time-varying only if the function
λ(.) is nonconstant. Hence, the model can imply a time-varying RRA with constant
risk premia. Campbell and Cochrane stress the importance of time-variation in the
Sharpe-ratio which can only be achieved when the EIS is changing over time.
4.5 Non-expected Utility
Building on Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1991) have formulated a pref-
erence specification which allows the distinction between RRA and the elasticity of in-














The notation is from Campbell (1993). γ is the coefficient of RRA and σ is the EIS. See
Epstein and Zin (1991), Giovannini and Weil (1989) and Campbell (1993) for a more
detailed description of these preferences.
It is straightforward to calculate the preference-based stochastic discount factor for
pricing assets Mt+1 for these preferences, see equation (46) in appendix A.3. However,
Mt+1 involves “unobservables” such as Ut+1. In order to make the asset pricing equa-
tion econometrically more useful, Epstein and Zin (1989,1991) and essentially the entire
literature following it, made the additional assumption, that the agent is representative,
that he owns assets, the returns to which he can either consume or reinvest, and that
there is no other source of income. Using these obviously highly restrictive assumptions,













where Rm is the gross return on invested wealth (i.e. the market portfolio). Since our
aim is to interpret the findings of the literature, we follow its footsteps and proceed with
this equation rather than equation (46).















It seems that an EIS close unity can generate large ηmε irrespective of RRA. However,
as shown by Campbell (1993) the model implies a relationship between unexpected
consumption and unexpected return on the market portfolio:




where ρ is a parameter related to the consumption-wealth ratio and is close to unity.
Substituting out the market return in (31), we get
mt+1 = Etmt+1 − γεt+1 − (1− σγ)λm,t+1, (33)
where λm,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑∞
j=1 ρ
jrm,t+1+j represents the ‘news’ of future expected
returns of the market portfolio between period t and t+1. Equation (33) tells us that an
EIS close unity does not imply a high ηmε. The impact of the consumption innovation
on the PSDF depends only on RRA, as in the CRRA case. The EIS only affects the
PSDF through changes in expected returns of the market portfolio. If returns are i.i.d.
or if γ = 1/σ we obtain the same PSDF as in the time-separable CRRA case (see also
Campbell (1993) for a more extensive discussion). The effect of λm in (33) is likely to
be fairly small since returns are difficult to forecast. Therefore, the Epstein and Zin
preferences require a high risk aversion to generate a high Sharpe-ratio. In this regard
they are only a small improvement over the standard time-separable CRRA preferences.
Of course, what the Epstein-Zin preferences do accomplish is to allow for high risk
aversion without simultaneously implying a low EIS.
4.6 A Summary and Outlook
Before turning to the issue of consumption smoothing, we want to summarize the im-
portant properties of the different preferences considered above. In order to generate a
high Sharpe-ratio, the standard time-separable CRRA preference specification requires a
high coefficient of RRA of around 50 which implies a low EIS of about 0.02. Epstein-Zin
preferences disentangle RRA from intertemporal substitution. RRA of around 50 is still
required to produce a high Sharpe-ratio but the EIS is not restricted. It is an open
issue whether such high RRA is reasonable. It is obviously very hard to estimate risk
aversion of a representative agent directly. Some experimental evidence suggests that
risk aversion is generally not that high. As an illustration of the implications of RRA of
50, consider an agent who is faced with a 50-50 gamble of gaining or losing 10% of her
total wealth. An agent with RRA of unity would be willing to pay 0.5% of her wealth to
avoid that gamble, an agent with RRA of 50 would be willing to pay 8.7% of her wealth.
In light of these numbers, we regard such high RRA as unplausible.
This line of argument motivated Constantinides (1990) to study the influence of habit
formation on asset prices. With habit formation risk premia can be high with low risk
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aversion. However, the EIS is required to be around 0.02, just as in the standard CRRA
case. In the next section we will show that such a low EIS implies that consumers
prefer an extremely smooth consumption path. In an exchange economy this is of no
consequence for the resulting consumption path because agents have no opportunity
to transfer consumption from one period to the next. However, once there are any
smoothing channels available (such as a storage technology), agents with a low EIS will
use these possibilities to create a less volatile consumption path. This in turn will lower
the Sharpe-ratio. In other words, preferences with a low EIS imply low risk premia in
economies with consumption smoothing channels.
5 Consumption Smoothing
The Lucas (1978) model has been the basis for consumption-based asset pricing. It has
been a useful easy-to-use tool to compute risk premia as a function on their covariance
risk with consumption. However, the simplicity of the model has also led to an extreme
one-sided view, namely how consumption, via preferences, affects asset prices. The
basis for this approach is a pure exchange economy. Agents are forced to consume their
(exogenously) given endowment. They do not have access to any storage technology
for the consumption good. Through this modeling trick the consumption process can
viewed as being exogenous to the model. Preferences of consumers determine then the
capital market line as shown above. The advantage of this approach is that a realistic
consumption process can be assumed from the outset. The underlying presumption
is that consumption is determined outside the model and can hence be taken to be
exogenous.
While this approach is useful as a first test for preferences, a more complete model
should include consumption as a real choice variable. The danger of the search for the
‘right’ preferences using exchange economies is that it is unlikely that these preferences
generate the assumed consumption process. In this sense, the exchange economy can
serve as a necessary but not sufficient condition in the search for preferences. A more
complete model should always be kept in mind when one is writing down a pure exchange
economy. In this section, we make this argument more precise using a simple extension
to the exchange economy where a storage technology allows consumers to transfer goods
between periods. In other words, the consumption good can be converted into a storable
capital good. The underlying shock is assumed to affect the productivity of the firm
(or the trees in the Lucas economy). The properties of the stochastic process of pro-
ductivity are taken from the standard practice in macroeconomics to match the Solow
residual. The following equations are added to the exchange economy. Consumers face
an intertemporal budget constraint:
Ct +Kt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt−1, (34)
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where Kt denotes the stock of capital, Yt denotes output and δ is a depreciation factor.




Zt is a productivity parameter. zt = logZt is assumed to follow the stochastic process
zt = ψzt−1 + ζt, ζt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
ζ). (36)
The variance of ζ can be measured using the Solow residual, Hansen (1985) uses σζ =
0.763%, which we will also use. Note that this number is slightly higher than σε. Usually
it is assumed that shocks are highly persistent, we use ψ = 0.95. The depreciation rate
is set to δ = 0.025. The model is solved using the log-linear technique described e.g. by
Campbell (1994) and Uhlig (1995).
The key difference to the exchange economy is how consumption is determined. In
this model agents can save part of a shock ζt. Let ηcζ denote the elasticity of consumption
with respect to ζ. In an exchange economy this elasticity is by assumption equal to unity.
In contrast, ηcζ depends on the preferences of agents in the economy with storage, in
other words it is an endogenous variable. The innovation to consumption can be written
as εt = ηcζζ. Hence we can write the Sharpe-ratio
SR = −ηmε σε (37)
= −ηmε ηcζ σζ . (38)
The key insight is that changing the preference parameter ηmε will affect the consumption
path and therefore ηcζ . To be more concrete, take preferences where −ηmε = 1/EIS such
as time-separable CRRA or habit formation. Lowering the EIS will make consumers more
reluctant to change consumption over time. Hence they will save a larger proportion
of a positive productivity shock which implies a lower ηmζ . The effect of a lower EIS
increases the Sharpe-ratio while a lower ηmζ decreases it. The net effect is ambiguous. In
other word, preferences with a low EIS tend to generate high Sharpe-ratios in exchange
economies but fail to do so in economies with savings.
5.1 Exchange Economy vs. Savings Economy
Table 3 compares the asset pricing implications in an exchange economy and an economy
with savings as described above. The table reports the Sharpe-ratio, the risk premium
of an infinite claim to consumption as well as the elasticity of consumption with respect
to an exogenous shock, ηcζ . In an exchange economy ηcζ is always unity by assumption.
In an economy where consumers can save, they will generally save a fraction of a positive
shock to productivity. How much they want to save depends on the the EIS implied by
their preferences. We consider five preference specifications in Table 3. The first three
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Table 3: Exchange Economy vs. Economy with Savings
data: SR=0.27, EqPrem=2%
Preference Parameters Exchange Economy Economy with Savings
γ = 1 SR 0.0056 0.0013
ηcζ 1.0000 0.2264
CPrem 0.0031 0.0005
γ = 10 SR 0.0560 0.0171
ηcζ 1.0000 0.2368
CPrem 0.0314 0.0189
γ = 50 SR 0.2800 0.0695
ηcζ 1.0000 0.1931
CPrem 0.1568 0.1325
γ = 2.1 SR 0.0560 0.0069
θ = 0.5 ηcζ 1.0000 0.0947
(ηmε = −10, RRA=2.2) CPrem 0.0314 0.0012
γ = 1.6 SR 0.2800 0.0108
θ = 0.8 ηcζ 1.0000 0.0296
(ηmε = −50, RRA=1.9) CPrem 0.1568 0.0067
Note: Table shows asset prices for different preferences in an exchange e-
conomy and an economy with savings. SR is the Sharpe-ratio and ηcζ
denotes the elasticity of consumption with respect to an exogenous shock.
CPrem is the risk premium (in %) on an infinite stream to a consumption
claim. The log-consumption process in the exchange economy is ct+1 =
0.0044 + ct + ζt+1, ζt+1 ∼ N(0, 0.00562). The parameters in the savings e-
conomy are as in the text.
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are standard time-separable CRRA preferences with different RRA. The other two cases
are habit formation preferences as described in Section 4.2. The parameters of the habit
formation preferences are chosen to match the ηmε of the CRRA preferences for γ = 10
and 50 respectively. Recall the for habit formation preferences the EIS is minus the
inverse of ηmε.
Consider first the CRRA preferences with γ = 1. Using (14) the Sharpe-ratio in the
exchange economy is equal to the standard deviation of the consumption innovation. As
already discussed in Section 3.2 this value is too small by a factor of 50. Increasing RRA
in the exchange economy proportionally increases the Sharpe-ratio. Hence a RRA of 50
delivers a Sharpe-ratio which matches the data. Note that the habit preferences imply
the exact same Sharpe-ratios as the CRRA preferences for matching ηmε. To demonstrate
that risk aversion does not control asset prices, note that the preference parameter in
row 4 imply a higher RRA than those in row five. The Sharpe-ratio is larger for the low
risk aversion case. The risk premium on the infinitely lived claim to consumption is far
too small for any of the preferences (see the discussion in Section 3.3).
The picture is quite different in the economy with savings possibilities. For γ = 1
agents consume only 22.64% of a shock and hence save 77.36% of the effect of the
shock. This reduces the Sharpe-ratio to 0.0013, less than one fourth of the value in
the exchange economy. Increasing the risk aversion in the savings economy does not
change the reaction of consumption after a shock very much. Consumers with CRRA
preferences save around 80% of the shock. The effect of savings for the habit formation
consumer is even more dramatic. For γ = 2.1 and θ = 0.5 only 10% of the shock is
saved dramatically reducing the Sharpe-ratio in comparison to the exchange economy.
The reason for smaller consumption response compared to the CRRA preferences with a
corresponding EIS of 1/10 is the effect of today’s consumption on tomorrow’s marginal
utility. Habit formation consumers prefer a smoother adjustment of consumption. A
stronger habit (θ = 0.8, γ = 1.6) leads to an even slower adjustment. Note that the risk
premia on the infinite consumption stream are all small in the savings economy, largely
due to the smaller Sharpe-ratio.
The bottom line of this section is that preferences which are based on a low EIS may
produce high Sharpe-ratios in exchange economies but they will fail to do so once agents
are allowed to save from period to period. In this section we computed asset prices in
an economy with only one channel through which consumption can be smoothed. Most
macroeconomic models include a second channel, namely labor input. Once labor is
added to the production function and leisure to the preferences, agents can vary their
labor input in response to shocks. For more detailed results of such a model see Lettau
and Uhlig (1996). In general the response of consumption to a shock is much smaller
and hence the Sharpe-ratios are decreasing as well. To give a representative number, a
consumer in the Hansen (1985) model with variable labor input will consume only 1.4%
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of a shock for a RRA of 50. So the more smoothing channels are available to agent, the
smaller the Sharpe-ratio. The exchange economy is an extreme point in this spectrum
delivering the largest possible Sharpe-ratio.
6 Idiosyncratic Shocks
In light of the rather bleak outlook for the complete markets model considered above,
researchers have expanded the standard model to allow for idiosyncratic risk for the
individual consumer. Constantinides and Duffy (1996), Den Haan (1996) and Heaton
and Lucas (1996) have studied versions of these models as a possible avenue to explain
high risk premia. In this section we will use the Sharpe-ratio to evaluate the potential
of models with idiosyncratic shocks. We will show that ‘simple’ versions of these models
will probably not be successful in increasing the Sharpe-ratio in an economy. Instead
it takes more elaborate setups as in Constantinides and Duffy (1996) which operate on
second moments of the cross-sectional distribution of agents.
Suppose log consumption of consumer i is given by
cit+1 = Etc
i
t+1 + εt+1 + ε
i
t+1, (39)
where εt+1 represents the aggregate shock common to each consumer and εit+1 is the
idiosyncratic shock of consumer i. We assume that εt+1 and εit+1 are independently
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2ε and σ
2
εi, respectively. The log
IMRS of consumer i is then
mit+1 = Etm
i
t+1 + ηmε(εt+1 + ε
i
t+1). (40)






For ηmε = −5 and σε = 0.56%, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component
has to σεi has to be 5.4% to create a Sharpe-ratio of 0.27. Hence the idiosyncratic
consumption has to be about ten times as large as the aggregate consumption risk.
However, a closer look shows that equation (41) is misleading. Recall the definition
of the Sharpe-ratio in (10). In constructing the asset with a conditional correlation of
-1 with the IMRS we needed an asset which is perfectly negatively correlated with the
IMRS. In the case without idiosyncratic risk, one such asset is a one-period consumption
claim. However, in a model with idiosyncratic consumption risk, the individual IMRS
enters the definition of the Sharpe-ratio. Hence an asset with ρt(M it+1, Rt+1) = −1 has
to have a return which is perfectly negatively correlated with individual consumption.
To see this first note that ρ(ex, ey) ≈ ρ(x, y) for normal x and y and small covariance.
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11 Consider some one-period asset with dividend dt+1, then







This shows that dt+1 has to be perfectly correlated with the aggregate and idiosyncratic
consumption shocks to achieve a perfect correlation. One such asset would a claim to
individual consumption. The existence of such assets is questionable because of the very
nature of idiosyncratic risk. If insurance market for these types of risk do not exist, how
can there be an asset whose dividend depend on these risks? If these assets existed, then
the agent would use these assets to insure herself against these risks.
If there are no assets with dividends depending on the idiosyncratic consumption risk,
then it is straightforward to show the the Sharpe-ratio is again SR = −ηmεσε, the same
as in the model without idiosyncratic risk.
This argument shows that just adding some uninsurable income risk to the standard
complete markets model will not substantially increase risk premia. Den Haan (1996)
and Heaton and Lucas (1996) have studied models in which subsets of agents are subject
to uninsurable shocks. Heaton and Lucas (1996) report somewhat higher risk premia in
their economy with two groups of agents, each of which is subject to an idiosyncratic
shock. The reason for higher risk premia in such a model is that half of the population
is subject to a shock. If many agents are affected by a shock their reaction will have
an effect on the entire market. This causes a correlation between a shock and aggregate
dividends which in turn increases the Sharpe-ratio, as shown in (42). Note that this
argument depends on the market power of the agents which are subject to a common
shock. Den Haan (1996) has shown that it is much harder to increase risk premia in
models in which each individual agent is subject to a shock. Since one agent cannot
affect the aggregate market there is no correlation with an idiosyncratic shock. Hence
the Sharpe-ratio will remain low.
Constantinides and Duffy (1996) present a more elaborate model in which a the con-
ditional variance of the cross-sectional distribution enters pricing kernel. This variance
is varying over time and can be correlated with aggregate dividends. This correlation
can increase the Sharpe-ratio. In order to allow for this channel working through second
moments in our setup, we would have to relax the assumption of constant variances of
the shocks. What the argument in this section shows, however, is that simple model-
s including idiosyncratic shocks will not increase the risk-return tradeoff substantially.
Only more complicated models working through second moments have the potential to
increase the Sharpe-ratio in an economy.
11The exact expression is ρ(ex, ey) = (eσxy − 1)/(σxσy).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we showed how the role of preferences and dividends concerning risk pre-
mia can be separated. Preferences determine the position of the capital market line
while dividends determine the position of an asset on or below the capital market line.
We used the Sharpe-ratio as a general measure of the risk - return tradeoff implied by
preferences. The only preference parameter affecting the Sharpe-ratio is the elasticity
of a preference-based stochastic discount factor for pricing assets with respect to the
consumption innovation. We relate this preference discount factor elasticity to more s-
tandard preference parameters such as relative risk aversion or the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. For some preferences the preference factor elasticity is related to
relative risk aversion, for other preferences it is related to the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Independently of the particular preferences, a preference factor elasticity
of about -50 is required to match the Sharpe-ratio in post-war data. For preferences
often considered in the literature, this requires either a high relative risk aversion of 50
(for Epstein-Zin preferences), a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.02 (for
habit formation) or both (for time-separable constant relative risk aversion). While a
relative risk aversion of 50 is often regarded as unplausible, we argue that a low elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of 0.02 is also hard to accept because agents will smooth
consumption extremely if at all possible. Hence we conclude that none of the preferences
used in the literature provides a satisfying solution for the Sharpe-ratio puzzle. We also
show that simple models with incomplete markets such as uninsurable income risk may
not help to increase the Sharpe-ratio because dividends have to be correlated not only
with aggregate consumption but also with individual (uninsurable) consumption.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we show that our generalized form of preferences includes all the
preference specifications analyzed in this paper, and we derive the asset pricing formula.
We follow the dating convention that anything dated t is measurable with respect to the
information at date t, but, typically, not earlier.
First, we repeat the assumptions made in the main text, allowing in slight gener-
alization for a vector of consumption goods. Let (St)t be a Markov process on some
state space and let consumption Ct ∈ RnC be determined by a function Ct = C(St) of
the state St. Let Zt ∈ RnZ denote “summary” information about past consumption,
evolving according to a summarizer function g:
Zt = g(Ct, Zt−1)
Let V (St, Zt−1) ∈ R be the “value function” of the remaining stream of consumption as
of date t, evolving according to
V (S, Z) = f(C(S), Z, E[h (V (S ′, g(C(S), Z))) | S], S) (43)
where f(C,Z,E, S) ∈ R is an aggregator function and h(V ) ∈ R is a (typically mono-
tone) transformation of V . The agent prefers higher values of V (·, ·) to lower values.
Given everything else, it is not clear at all, that a function V (·, ·) satisfying the func-
tional equation (43) exists: surely, any proof will require some additional restrictions.
In fact, proving existence for essentially a special case is much of the work in Epstein
and Zin (1989). For the purpose of the paper here we do not intend to generalize their
analysis. Instead, we simply want to think of (43) as a general form in which several,
well-known and well-behaved specifications can be stated, and for which a first-order
approach is justified, and which may include some further interesting and more general
cases as well.
A.1 Special cases
We show now that the preference specifications in the main text fit the description. We
keep the description of the consumption process as above: clearly, a random walk for
consumption is contained as a special case.








h(V ) = V
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+ βE
h(V ) = V
Catching up with the Joneses: Let C̄ = C̄(S) be aggregate consumption as a func-
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h(V ) = V 1−γ
so that V (St, Zt−1) = Ut.
None of the examples includes several consumption goods such as leisure, but it is easy
to think of further examples, and is clear that the general description allows for them.
A.2 The Lucas asset pricing equation
To derive the Lucas asset pricing equation, we perform the following mind experiment.
Suppose there is some asset, which can be purchased for the consumption bundle C̃ ∈
RnC at date t and which pays the random consumption bundle R = Rt+1 ∈ RnC at date
t+ 1.
Imagine investing a marginal amount in this asset by reducing consumption at date
t by some amount C̃ε, where ε ∈ R and | ε | is small, and using the proceeds to increase
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consumption at date t+ 1 by the amount Rε. If the agent had the possibility to trade
in this asset when solving for his optimal consumption plan, and if the agent was not
restricted in the direction of the trade in that asset, then this mind experiment should
not result in an increase in value for the agent. Taking ε → 0, we arrive at a marginal
condition, which needs to be satisfied: we assume that we are allowed to differentiate
and to exchange expectations and differentiation, whenever needed.
To perform the analysis, let v(ε) = V (s, z; ε) denote the value V (·, ·) for some ε, in
which consumption is altered in the manner described above. Written explicitly, we get
v(ε) = f
(


























To abbreviate the notation, let
Et[·] = E[· | S]
Vt = V (S, Z)
ft = f(C(S), Z, E[V (S
′, g(C(S), Z)) | S], S)
gt = g(C(S), Z)
ht = h(Vt)
and likewise for Et+1, Vt+1, Vt+2, ft+1, gt+1, ht+1, ht+2 and their partial derivatives, ft,1,






































1 = Et [Mt+1Rt+1] (45)
as claimed, where we have used Rt+1 instead of R again. The important point here
is, that Mt+1 depends on the asset only via the “price” C̃. Note, that if spot markets
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are complete, then there is no loss in generality in assuming that C̃ is the same vector
independent of the asset under consideration, making Mt+1 “asset free”. This is typically
the case for calculations with utility functions, which only involve one consumption good:
there, one typically sets C̃ = 1 and interprets Rt+1 as the real return in terms of that
consumption good for investing one unit in it. More generally, one then typically sets
C̃ to be a unit vector, i.e. a vector containing only zeros except for one entry for a
particular consumption good which is set to one, and likewise formulates R as random
factor times this vector, so that R (or this random factor) can be interpreted as the
return in terms of that particular consumption good.
A.3 Asset pricing with Epstein-Zin preferences
The goal in Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) was to derive asset pricing implications in
terms of observable magnitudes, using their nonexpected utility specification. To do
this, they assumed that there is a representative agent: in that case, “unobservables”
such as utilities could be substituted out using data on market returns, etc.. Of course,
there is no problem in principle to derive the Lucas asset pricing condition for an agent
with Epstein-Zin preferences living in an arbitrary economy and enjoying some given
stochastic stream of consumption: that asset pricing equation can be derived exactly as
in the previous section. In the notation of the main text of this paper, one obtains after
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